



Recently there have been several horrendous cases of multi-
ple murders committed in California by persons who had either
been "cleared" by psychiatrists or who had been discharged from
mental institutions as "no longer dangerous."' Such cases invari-
ably result in strong demands on the part of law enforcement
officials and from the public for psychiatrists to "do something"
to protect against such irrational killings.
In 1964, Edmund E. Kemper III, a fifteen-year-old boy,
shot and killed his grandmother and grandfather. He was com-
mitted to Atascadero State Hospital,2 where he was confined and
treated for five years. He was returned to the jurisdiction of the
California Youth Authority and in 1970, being twenty-one, was
released. In September 1972, he applied to the court to have his
records sealed.3 Feeling some uncertainty about Kemper's men-
tal condition, the court appointed two psychiatrists to examine
him. Both psychiatrists reported that he was not dangerous or
otherwise a threat to society. However, it later was revealed that
he had murdered and dismembered six young girls, his mother,
and one of his mother's friends during the course of a year. One
of the murders had been accomplished four days before the
psychiatric examinations which declared him harmless.
4
Such cases, understandably, greatly alarm the public and
hardly inspire confidence in the ability of psychiatrists to predict
t Professor of Law and Criminology, University of California, Berkeley; Clinical
Professor of Psychiatry, University of California, San Francisco. A.B. 1935, University of
California, Berkeley; M.D. 1939, University of California, San Francisco.
' See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, June 4, 1973, at 69.
2 Atascadero is a California institution for the criminally insane and mentally disor-
dered sex offenders.
3 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.45 (West Supp. 1974) provides for the sealing of records
of persons who were under the age of 18 at the time of the arrest. "Thereafter such
conviction, arrest, or other proceeding shall be deemed not to have occurred, -and the
petitioner may answer accordingly any question relating to their occurrence." Id. §
1203.45(a). This section was not intended to apply to minors convicted of felonies, but
Kemper had not been so convicted because of his mental condition.
4 See note 1 supra.
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dangerousness. Nevertheless, the courts rely heavily upon such
psychiatric predictions both in criminal cases and in civil com-
mitments for involuntary hospitalization. Particularly in recent
years, with the growing emphasis on civil rights of the mentally
ill, the state of being dangerous to self or others may be the only
ground for involuntary hospitalization under progressive stat-
utes.5 Rubin estimates that "[a]pproximately 50,000 mentally ill
persons per year are predicted to be dangerous and preventa-
tively detained for society's and their protection as well as
treatment.6
Can psychiatrists predict danger with reasonable accuracy?
Are there well established clinical symptoms which, if present,
can be relied upon to indicate potential danger? Can one be
reasonably sure that persons who are not dangerous will not be
labeled as such and unnecessarily confined? I believe the answer
to all these questions is an emphatic "no."
This Article will discuss the psychiatrist's difficulty in pre-
dicting dangerousness to others and will propose procedural
changes in the handling of potentially dangerous persons. The
problem of dangerousness to self will not be discussed here, as it
involves quite different clinical and legal problems.
I. THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF DANGEROUSNESS
Because of the urgent need for protection against mentally
ill persons who are dangerous, and because of the almost uni-
versal reliance upon expert psychiatric advice for the preventive
detention of such individuals, one would suppose that there
existed a sizable amount of valid clinical and research informa-
tion concerning the prediction of dangerousness. However,
there are remarkably few such studies in the scientific litera-
ture, and those that do exist have many deficiencies which
impair their reliability.
Studies concerning prediction of dangerous behavior fall
into two broad categories: those that tend to substantiate clinical
predictors and those which demonstrate that such clinical predic-
tions are unreliable. Among the former is an article by Malm-
5 See, e.g., the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 5000-150
(West 1972).
6 Rubin, Prediction of Dangerousness in Mentally Ill Criminals, 27 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIAT.
397 (1972).
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quist, who examined twenty adolescents charged with murder.7
Malmquist was specifically interested in the possible existence of
premonitory signs and symptoms which could be used to predict
violence in other cases. Definite clinical findings were present
which were of considerable help in understanding the dynamic
process which led up to the homicidal acts. The clinical findings
were summarized under the rubrics of behavorial changes prior
to the homicidal act; a "call for help" by the juvenile; use of
drugs; object losses"; threats to manhood; somatization,
hypochondiasis, or a recurrent medical problem; an emotional
crescendo; and homosexual threats. But, as Malmquist states,
"Certain premonitory signs and symptoms culminating in a
homicide appeared consistently. But a major difficulty is the
prevalence of similar signs and symptoms in people who never
commit a violent act."9
MacDonald followed up one hundred consecutive threat-
to-kill admissions to the Colorado Psychopathic Hospital. 10
Within five to six years of the original admission, three of these
patients had taken the lives of others and four had committed
suicide. Obviously, these seven fatalities are of significance; yet
one can hardly justify a preventive detention procedure when
over ninety percent of the suspected persons do not commit
dangerous acts. In fairness to the clinicians who predicted the
dangerousness, it should be noted that it is impossible to estimate
how many of those patients might have committed dangerous
acts if there had not been the intervention of hospitalization.
Hellman and Blackman have described a triad of symp-
toms-enuresis, firesetting, and cruelty to animals-which, if ex-
hibited in childhood, are claimed to be predictive of aggressive
violent crimes in the adult." This triad is well known and widely
utilized by clinicians in the prediction of dangerousness. Refer-
ence to the original report reveals that of thirty-one prisoners
charged with aggressive crimes, twenty-three had the full triad.
Of fifty-three nonaggressive prisoners, only seven had the full
Malmquist, Premonitory Signs of Homicidal Aggression in Juveniles, 128 AM. J.
PSYCHIAT. 461 (1971).
8 In dynamic psychiatry, "object loss" refers to the loss of the object of one's love,
such as a lover or mother, and not to the loss of an object as a "thing."
9 Malmquist, supra note 7, at 46.
10 MacDonald, Homicidal Threats, 124 Ams. J. PSYCHIAT. 475 (1967).
1 Hellman & Blackman, Enuresis, Firesetting and Cruelty to Animals: A Triad Predictive
of Adult Crime, 122 Am. J. PSYCHIAT. 1431 (1966).
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triad and eight more had a history of part of the triad. This is a
very significant clincial difference, but not of a magnitude and
consistency to justify involuntary detention on the basis of such
predictive criteria. Further, a subsequent study by Climent, Hyg,
and Ervin comparing forty emergency room patients brought in
because of violent behavior with a matched group of control
cases, failed to show a consistent difference in regard to the
triad. 12
Bach-y-Rita and his colleagues have reported the association
of head injury and aggressive criminal behavior.' 3 However,
Climent and Ervin were subsequently unable to confirm a corre-
lation between severe head injury and adult violence.' 4 They still
concluded that there is some relationship between childhood
head injury and violent adult behavior, and this corresponds to
my own clinical experience. Nevertheless, such an uncertain clin-
ical relationship should not be used as a predictor when the
consequence of a false positive prediction is loss of liberty and
social stigmatization of a harmless individual.
Various authors have set forth in a pragmatic fashion what
they believe are danger signs which indicate potential violence.
Usually such assertions claim to be based upon study of hun-
dreds of persons who have killed or threatened to kill. A typical
assertion of this sort is made by the psychiatrist David
Abrahamsen.' 5 In addition to more obvious signs, such as exces-
sive aggressiveness, temper tantrums, and intense and recurrent
fantasies of revenge, Abrahamsen also includes qualities such as
loneliness, withdrawal, isolation, and even "speech and spelling
errors."' 6 He claims that when there is a pronounced incidence
of two or more of his fourteen signs, acting out of violent im-
pulses is to be suspected. The absurdity of this claim is demon-
2 Climent & Ervin, Historical Data in the Evaluation of Violent Subjects, 27 ARCH. GEN.
PSYCHIAT. 621, 624 (1972). But see Wax & Haddox, Enuresis, Firesetting, and Animal Cruelty
in Male Adolescent Delinquents: A Triad Predictive of Violent Behavior, 2 J. PSYCH. & LAw 45
(1974). This report of six dangerously assaultive adolescent boys who exhibited all three
symptoms of the triad seems to support the original Hellman & Blackman study, supra
note 11. However, the claim by Wax and Haddox that the triad has predictive value is
weakened by their failure to present any information as to the frequency of the triad in
non-aggressive children.
13 Bach-y-Rita, Lion, Climent & Ervin, Episodic Dyscontrol: A Study of 130 Violent
Patients, 127 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 1473 (1971).
14 Climent & Ervin, supra note 12, at 624.
15 D. ABRAHAMSEN, OUR VIOLENT SOCIETY 218 (1970).
16 Id.
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strated by the fact that, by Abrahamsen's own criteria, spelling
errors, loneliness, and excessive truancy would, as three such
signs, be evidence of dangerousness.
A similar, though more complex, claim is made by
Hartogs. 17 He lists twelve characterological signs, thirteen de-
velopmental signs, fourteen sociological signs, and nine organic
(physical) signs, a total of forty-eight predictors of violence. He
gives no statistical or clinical data to support his claim that these
forty-eight signs are valid predictors. As with Abrahamsen's
signs, some are simply tautological statements that the individual
is dangerous, and others are characteristics so widespread that
they lose all predictive value in discriminating between the
dangerous and the harmless. For example, Hartogs asserts that
"[l]ack of family interest, love, support, or acceptance"'Is and
"[c]onflict over basic identity"' 9 are signs of potential violence.
It would be difficult for an objective observer to take such
claims seriously if such pseudo-scientific descriptions had not
been reiterated so often that they have become part of the ac-
cepted mythology of clinical practice. I am sure that many pa-
tients have been labeled as dangerous and have been in-
stitutionalized for long periods of time upon the basis of such
flimsy clinical criteria.
The lack of definitive predictive criteria does not mean that
there is not valid scientific evidence for assuming a causative
relationship between certain psychological and sociological ex-
periences of the child and adult violence. Further, there is in-
creasing interest in biomedical research on the brain and aggres-
sively violent behavior.20 Some claimed discoveries, such as the
XYY chromosomal abnormality and its supposed association
with crime, aroused great interest, only to be invalidated by
further investigations. 2' Other studies, in connection with
psychosurgery, are surrounded by intense controversy, both sci-
17 Hartogs, Who Will Act Violently: The Predictive Criteria, in VIOLENCE: CAUSES AND
SOLUTIONS 332 (R. Hartogs & E. Artzt eds. 1970).
Is Id. 335.
'9 Id. 333.
20 For a thorough, up-to-date review of this biomedical research, see Goldstein, Brain
Research and Violent Behavior, 30 ARCH. NEURO. 1 (1974). Goldstein is meticulous in his
documentation; hundreds of references to the scientific literature are included.
21 CENTER FOR STUDIES OF CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
MENTAL HEALTH, REPORT ON THE XYY CHROMOSOMAL ABNORMALITY 33-34 (Public
Health Service Pub. No. 2103, 1970).
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entific and political. 22
Goldstein's comprehensive review of brain research and
violence2 3 was based in part upon evaluation discussions of a
large group of experienced clinicians. They concluded: "Some of
the already agreed upon predictive factors [of an act leading to
murder] are a childhood history of maternal deprivation, poor
father identification, or both; nocturnal enuresis; possibly fire
setting; violence towards animals; and brutalization by one or
both parents.
2 4
This corresponds to my own clinical experience with both
mentally ill and supposedly healthy persons who have committed
or attempted murder. I would even say that the conclusion of
the clinicians cited by Goldstein represents the sum total of our
present scientific knowledge concerning predictive factors of
murderous violence. Yet I have repeatedly found some, and
sometimes all, of these predictive factors in individuals who have
never committed even the slightest harmful act, let alone assault
or murder. And I have examined offenders who have commit-
ted the most extraordinarily brutal acts of great violence and
lethality who possessed none of these factors.
I know of no reports in the scientific literature which are
supported by valid clinical experience and statistical evidence
that describe psychological or physical signs or symptoms which
can be reliably used to discriminate between the potentially
dangerous and the harmless individual. The fact that certain
signs may sometimes be associated with violent behavior, as, for
example, certain types of abnormal brain waves, or that persons
who have committed acts of violence tend to reveal in their past
histories certain common features, such as an unusual exposure
to 4iolence in early childhood, or a higher than average inci-
dence of childhood head injuries, in no way meets the legal need
for criteria which will discriminate between the potentially vio-
lent and the harmless individual.
II. STATISTICAL STUDIES
There are a number of statistical studies which amply dem-
onstrate that the predictions of dangerousness by psychiatrists
2 Compare V. MARK & F. ERVIN, VIOLENCE AND THE BRAIN (1970), with Breggin, The
Return of the Lobotomy and Psychosurgery, 118 CONG. REC. 5567 (1972) (extension of re-
marks of Rep. Gallagher).
2' Goldstein, supra note 20.
24 Id. 27.
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are unreliable. 25 Some of the studies are described in only casual
fashion by their authors, but the findings so consistently demon-
strate that psychiatrists over-predict dangerousness by huge
amounts that the reports must be taken seriously.
Rappeport, director of the pioneer psychiatric court clinic,
in Baltimore, has reported:
In 1960 we studied patients who requested sanity hear-
ings or habeas corpus hearings. These were patients
committed to one of our state mental hospitals. All had
asked to be released, and all had been refused by the
hospital and subsequently asked the court to release
them. In essence, the hospital had said, we feel you are
too dangerous to yourself or the person and property
of others to leave. The court released one-third of them
after the hearing. Of the remaining two-thirds re-
manded, one-third subsequently ran away, eloped as we
say. The members of the remaining one-third either
died, were eventually discharged or are still there. Not
one of any of these patients got into any serious diffi-
culty with the law within the 1 to 10 year follow-up
period.26
Rubin provides a detailed report on the so-called Menard
patients.2 7 Seventeen mental patients had been labeled danger-
ously mentally ill and had been confined to the psychiatric divi-
sion of the Menard State Penitentiary in Illinois. A series of
administrative mix-ups and errors resulted in these seventeen
men spending a cumulative 425 years in prison after legislative
changes had required their reassignment to treatment or com-
munity settings. Rubin describes the shocking story of how these
men had been labeled as dangerous as a consequence of an
original accusation of a violent crime, a stereotype of.,danger-
ousness, and a reaffirmation of the dangerousness, rather than
on the basis of any realistic appraisal or clinically competent
examination. Rubin personally examined each of the seventeen
men and found that in no case was the prediction of dangerous-
ness valid.
The most important statistical study which reflects upon the
psychiatric prediction of dangerousness is concerned with the
25 For a bibliography of such studies see Rubin, supra note 6, at 407.
26 Rappeport, Dangerousness and the Mentally Ill Criminal, 21 S.C.L. REv. 23, 27 (1968).
27 Rubin, supra note 6, at 401.
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Baxstrom patients.28 New York law permitted prisoners who had
completed their maximum sentences and who were believed to
be still mentally ill and dangerous to be retained indefinitely in
maximum security hospitals for the criminally insane.29 The
United States Supreme Court, in Baxstrom v. Herold3" held that
such confinement violated the equal protection clause; as a con-
sequence, 967 such patients were transferred to ordinary, civil
mental hospitals.
Steadman, a research sociologist for the New York Depart-
ment of Mental Hygiene, with others, has made very careful
follow-up studies of the 967 Baxstrom cases.31 Four and one-half
years after the transfer approximately one-third of the Baxstrom
patients were free in the community. 32 Of the entire 967 pa-
tients, only twenty-six committed acts serious enough to warrant
their return to a maximum security hospital for the criminally
insane.3 3 Of these twenty-six returnees, fifteen were returned
because o behavior in the hospital defined by the staff as
dangerous. 34 One of these fifteen had made an assault resulting
in death;35 six had made assaults against persons.3 6 The remain-
ing eleven returnees had been rearrested after their release.
37
Six of these were found incompetent to stand trial, and were
returned to the maximum security hospital for that reason.38
The remaining five had been tried, convicted, and then transfer-
red to the institution as psychiatrically disordered criminals.
3 9
Two of these last five had committed homicides and a third
28 The cases were named after Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
29 Law of April 2, 1929, ch. 243, § 384, [1929] N.Y. Laws 599 (repealed 1966). The
statute currently in force authorizes retention of such individuals in ordinary, civil mental
hospitals upon completion of their sentence. N.Y. CORREC. LAW. § 385 (McKinney 1968).
30 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
31 See Halfon, David & Steadman, The Baxstrom Women: A Four Year Follow-Up of
Behavior Patterns, 45 PSYcmAT. Q. 518 (1971); Steadman, Follow-Up on Baxstrom Patients
Returned to Hospitals for the Criminally Insane, 130 AM. J. PsYcHAT. 317 (1973); Steadman
& Halfon, The Baxstrom Patients: Backgrounds and Outcomes, 3 SEM. PSYCHIAT. 376 (1971);
Steadman & Keveles, The Community Adjustment and Criminal Activity of the Baxstrom Pa-
tients: 1966-1970, 129 AM. J. PsYCHiAT. 304 (1972). See generally Hunt & Wiley, Operation
Baxstrom After One Year, 124 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 974 (1968).
'2 Steadman, supra note 3 1, at 317; Steadman & Keveles, supra note 3 1, at 305. Of a
different sample of 246 Baxtrom patients, 17% were arrested at some time. Id. 307-08.
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committed a second degree assault. 40
Steadman has attempted to differentiate the twenty-six re-
turnees from the other 941 patients. He fouhd that the return-
ees tended to be much younger than the others, with an average
age of thirty-three, as opposed to forty-seven for the
non-returnees. 41 He also found that the returnees' scores on a
"Legal Dangerousness Scale" (based on the history of criminal
behavior prior to institutionalization) were significantly higher
than the non-returnees'.42 However, this could not be used for
prediction of the necessity for return, for over ninety percent of
the patients with such a high score did not have to be returned.
43
I believe it is clear from the Baxstrom studies that of these
967 persons who had been convicted at one time of serious
crimes, and who were designated as mentally ill and dangerous
to others in order to justify their further confinement, only a
very few were actually dangerous. One can only conclude that
psychiatrists who make such judgments tended to over-predict
dangerousness greatly, by a factor somewhere between ten and a
hundred times the actual incidence of dangerous behavior. It is
understandable why this should be so. If the psychiatrist under-
predicts danger, and clears a patient who later commits a violent
act, he will be subjected to severe criticism. If, on the other hand,
he over-predicts danger, he will suffer no consequence from
such faulty prediction, for his prediction might have come true
had there been no intervention (such as institutionalization). In
general, if the psychiatrist predicts that there is no danger, the
feed-back from an erroneous prediction is real and immediate.
If he predicts that there is danger, there may be no feed-back,
or, if there is, it may not be possible to interpret it in ways which
would improve the predictive ability of the psychiatrist. Inevita-
bly, this will result in all concerned doing the "safe" thing: pre-
dicting dangerousness, if there are even the most minimal
reasons to justify it.
III. MENTAL ILLNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS
One factor which has impeded the ability of psychiatrists to
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the lack of a clear-cut association between mental illness (or any
particular form of mental illness) and dangeous behavior. Rap-
peport and Lassen were able to determine the post-hospitaliza-
tion arrest rates for all male patients over sixteen years of age
discharged from all but one of Maryland's psychiatric hospitals
during the fiscal years 1947 and 1957. 44 Their data, when com-
pared to the arrest rates of the similar male population of the
state as a whole, revealed that the rate for robbery was signific-
antly higher in the mental patients; the data also suggested that
there may have been a higher incidence of rape by the mental
patients before their hospitalization, but there was no evidence
that murder, negligent manslaughter, or aggravated assault of-
fenses were more common among the discharged hospital pa-
tients than in the general population.4 5 Other studies46 tend to
show a lesser involvement in criminal behavior by the mentally ill
than is true for the general population.
Guze and his associates at Washington University have pub-
lished many reports on the possible relationship of mental illness
and crime. 47 Their studies demonstrate that those conditions
which are most clearly recognized as mental illness, such as
schizophrenia and the other psychoses, are not found signifi-
cantly more often in the criminal population.48 On the other
hand, psychiatric conditions such as sociopathy, alcoholism, drug
dependence, and (among women offenders) hysteria were fre-
quently associated with adult criminality. 49 But these latter con-
ditions are precisely those psychiatric states which are less easily
" Rappeport & Lassen, Dangerousness-Arrest Rate Comparisons of Discharged Patients and
the General Population, 121 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 776, 777 (1965).
45 Id. 779.
46 Cited and summarized in id. 776.
47 See, e.g., Cloninger & Guze, Psychiatric Illness and Female Criminality: The Role of
Sociopathy and Hysteria in the Antisocial Woman, 127 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 303 (1970); Guze,
Goodwin & Crane, Criminality and Psychiatric Disorders, 20 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIAT. 583
(1969); Guze, Tuason, Gatfield, Stewart & Ricker, Psychiatric Illness and Crime with Particu-
lar Reference to Alcoholism: A Study of 223 Criminals, 134J. NERV. & MENT. Dis. 512 (1962);
Guze, Woodruff & Clayton, Hysteria and Antisocial Behavior: Further Evidence of an
Association, 127 Ami. J. PSYCHIAT. 957 (1971); Guze, Woodruff & Clayton, The Medical and
Psychiatric Implications of Antisocial Personality (Sociopathy), 32 Dis. NERV. SYST. 712 (1971).
48 Guze, Goodwin & Crane, supra note 47; Guze, Tuason, Gatfield, Stewart & Ricker,
supra note 47; Guze, Woodruff & Clayton, Psychiatric Disorders and Criminality, supra note
47. 47 See Cloninger & Guze, supra note 47; Guze, Goodwin, & Crane, supra note 47;
Guze, Tuason, Gatfield, Stewart & Ricker, supra note 47; Guze, Woodruff & Clayton,
Psychiatric Disorders and Criminality, supra note 47; Woodruff, Guze & Clayton, supra note
47.
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definable and less generally agreed to be illnesses at all.
"[E]xcept for [these conditions] and for sexually deviant be-
havior leading to arrest and conviction, other psychiatric disor-
ders are infrequently associated with felonies.
'50
Psychiatrists as well as courts tend to perceive dangerousness
as an attribute of an individual, as a quality which one ought to
be able to define, detect, and measure. Important decisions are
made based upon the presence or absence of this quality of
dangerousness, decisions which may result in the lifetime incar-
ceration of a person so designated. If the quality of dangerous-
ness is determined to be absent, as in the Kemper case, the lives
of many others may be jeopardized.
Theodore Sarbin, a psychologist and criminologist, has ar-
gued that the concept of danger and the concept of violence are
not coterminous, that danger always denotes a relationship. He
concludes that danger must not be construed as the expression
of a personality trait, but rather as a relationship of relative
power.51 Sarbin has emphasized the process of reification, the
process by which action or behavior becomes translated into an
attribute of the person. This is an extremely important concept.
For example, stealing is an action. To label a man who steals as a
thief is to reify the action into an attribute. It implies that the
man will continue to steal no matter what the situation, and that
his thieving behavior is a consequence only of factors within him.
For the same reason, one should not label a man who acts vio-
lently and causes harm as dangerous, for by so doing one has
transformed an action into an attribute and has knowingly or
unwittingly made the prediction that there will be future acts of
violence, and that these future acts will be determined by qual-
ities of the individual, not by the relationship or the circum-
stances. Although it may be convenient to label persons, to reify
behavior into attributes, and thus to predict future conduct, it
must be recognized that such a process has no scientific or logical
basis and that there is no reason to expect that such predictions
will come true.
Even if one accepts a simplistic concept of dangerousness,
such as a propensity to commit criminal acts, should one regard
50 Guze, Woodruff & Clayton, Psychiatric Disorders and Criminality, supra note 47, at
641.
51 Sarbin, The Dangerous Individual: An Outcome of Social Identity Transformations, 7
BRIT. J. CRIM. 285 (1967).
1974]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:439
dangerousness to property as being of the same social signifi-
cance as violence to the person of others? It is remarkable that
discussions of dangerousness so often fail to specify the nature
of the danger. Clearly, it makes a difference to society if an
offender is dangerous to property because of his need to write
graffiti on subway walls or if he is dangerous because he molests
little children or has an uncontrollable impulse to murder. Yet
some statutes completely ignore such distinctions, and give the
forensic psychiatrist no guidance.
52
Restricting the definition of dangerousness to the propen-
sity for violence is of no help, for violence itself is extremely
difficult to define.
No definition of violence has ever proved com-
pletely successful. Although everyone "knows what
violence is" no one has ever been able to define it ade-
quately so that every possible instance of violent be-
havior is included within the definition while all the
excluded behavior is clearly nonviolent. The working
definition that has been adopted for the purposes of
this Task Force is that acts of violence mean the "overtly
threatened or overtly accomplished application of force
which results in the injury or destruction of persons or
property or reputation, or the illegal appropriation of
property." 5
3
Such definitions are either so vague or so all-inclusive that no
reliance can be placed upon them in seeking to differentiate the
harmless from the dangerous. When such difficulties are cou-
pled with the even greater problems of defining mental illness,
sanity, and insanity,54 it is no wonder that gross confusion exists
and that the psychiatric predictions are devoid of validity and
reliability.
51 See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5150 (West 1972), which specifies "danger
to others, or to himself," as grounds for involuntary hospitalization. Even when statutes
define the general area of dangerousness, as is true for most "sexual psychopath" laws,
they are still so vague as to preclude any rational distinction between those who should be
confined and those who should not. California, for example, defines a "mentally disor-
dered sex offender" as "any person who by reason of mental defect, disease, or disorder,
is predisposed to the commission of sexual offenses to such a degree that he is dangerous
to the health and safety of others." Id. § 6300.
53 Megargee, A Critical Review of Theories of Violence, in 3 CRIMES OF VIOLENCE: A
STAFF REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES & PREVENTION
OF VIOLENCE 1037, 1038 (1969). .
54 See generally Rosenhan, On/Being Sane in Insane Places, 179 SCIENCE 250 (1973).
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IV. No MEANS OF PREDICTION EXIST
There is an unfortunate tendency in the psychiatric litera-
ture to imply that the scientific answers to pressing social prob-
lems which are not now capable of solution are likely to be avail-
able in the very near future, if only there is a bit more research.
Optimistic statements such as the following abound: "Elabora-
tion of methods for recognizing and understanding aggressive
patients may enable us to manage them or treat them in ways
which will reduce or eliminate their dangerousness and thus
permit the restoration of their liberty."
55
Realistically, it is more likely that the increase in our scien-
tific knowledge of human behavior, derived from both psyco-
logical and sociological sources, will increase, rather than de-
crease, the difficulty in applying such knowledge to legal issues.
Increased knowledge brings complexity rather than simplicity,
uncertainty rather than certainty, frequently blurring distinc-
tions rather than clarifying them. This knowledge thus becomes
less helpful to the all-or-none, two-valued decisionmaking pro-
cess of the law.
56
The evidence, as well as the consensus of opinion by respon-
sible scientific authorities, is now unequivocal. At a recent inter-
national conference there was general agreement by psychiatrists
and sociologists from many nations with the views expressed
by N. Christie, Professor of Criminology at the University of
Oslo: "There seems to be no convincing study to show that we
can predict really dangerous behavior with any amount of
acceptability.1
57
Finally, the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Ad-
ministration of the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare stated in a press release dated August 8, 1974: "Although
the psychiatric profession is frequently called upon to predict the
55 Scott, Violence in Prisoners and Patients, in MEDICAL CARE OF PRISONERS AND
DETAINEES 143, 152 (Ciba Foundation Symposium 16 (n.s.), 1973. I have been equally
guilty of making such optimistic predictions as to the ability of psychiatric science to
discover new information of great value to the law. See Diamond, From M'Naghten to
Currens, and Beyond, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 189, 198 (1962).
56 See generally Diamond, From Durham to Brawner, a Futile Journey, 1973 WASH.
U.L.Q. 109, 111-15 (1973).
57 Scott, supra note 55, at 153. Rappeport, Lassen, and Hay make a similar statement:
"[T]here are no articles that would assist us to any great extent in determining who might
be dangerous, particularly before he commits an offense." Rappeport, Lassen & Hay, A
Review of the Literature on the Dangerousness of the Mentally Ill, in THE CLINICAL EVALUATION
OF THE DANGEROUSNESS OF THE MENTALLY ILL 72, 79 (J. Rappeport ed. 1967).
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potential dangerousness of persons brought before the courts,
no scientifically reliable method for predicting dangerous be-
havior exists.1
58
Neither psychiatrists nor other behavioral scientists are able
to predict the occurrence of violent behavior with sufficient re-
liability to justify the restriction of freedom of persons on the
basis of the label of potential dangerousness. Accordingly, it is
recommended that courts no longer ask such experts to give
their opinion of the potential dangerousness of any person,
and that psychiatrists and other behavioral scientists acknowl-
edge their inability to make such predictions when called upon
to do so by courts and other legal agencies.
When appropriate legal authority has declared a person
dangerous, upon the basis of evidence of demonstrated violent
behavior, psychiatrists and other experts on human behavior
may be called upon to give their opinion whether the dangerous
behavior is a consequence of, or related to, the existence of men-
tal or emotional illness. Such experts may also be called upon to
give their opinions whether the so-called institutional or treat-
ment program "medical model" is appropriate for remedying
the dangerous condition and protecting society against the
danger. They should not be asked to do more.
58 U.S. Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare, HEW News (News Release, Aug. 8,
1974).
